THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: AN ASSESSMENT

The results of last Sunday’s parliamentary elections surprised many Russians. The biggest surprise to almost everyone was the powerful showing of the recently-formed pro-government Unity bloc which unexpectedly garnered support of some 23 percent of the vote, the second largest share after the Communists, who received 24 percent.

Four other parties and blocs also received the required minimum of 5 percent and will have party groups in the new composition of the State Duma, the lower house of Parliament.

Despite what can be viewed as the electoral success of the Communist Party, Russia’s largest and best organized political organization, observers agree that the most obvious result of the elections can be described as an overall victory of the pro-government forces over the left opposition.

When the returns from the elections first came in, it became clear that Communists and their allies, who constituted the majority in the old parliament, will lose their grip on the house in the next four years.

While the Communists received almost two percentage points more this year than in the 1995 elections, they are unlikely to have as much influence as they did in the last Duma, where Communists and their allies held 209 seats out of 450. In the new Duma, Communists may form a strategic alliance with other parties but will not enjoy the kind of control ensured in the previous Duma by their left-wing satellite parties like the Agrarians and the Popular Rule. These parties were not in the running this year.

Another surprise of the Sunday vote can be characterized as the unprecedented support the voters displayed toward the powers that be. The result may seem especially striking given the bad shape of Russian economy that has yet to recover from the financial crisis which hit the nation in 1998.

At the same time, no parliamentary group is likely to muster a clear majority in the new Duma. Most analysts agree that the moderate reform-minded bloc of pro-Kremlin forces and right-wing reformists has the most viable chance of all the factions to muster such a majority. An actual distribution of power through negotiations and political bargaining is the first major task that lies before the house.

In any event, one can already be sure that the future Duma will be much more effective and more capable of getting work done than its immediate predecessor dominated by the left "national patriotic coalition."

The profile of the newly elected Duma gives grounds for optimism that some of the laws, which had been blocked by the left opposition throughout the 4-year term of the previous Duma, will now pass the house. These laws include a special legislation against extremism and chauvinism and a ban on neo-Nazi symbols and propaganda.

Although the Duma has little effect on the makeup of the government, the election’s primary importance is the balance of political forces in today’s Russia – a situation that will heavily influence the Russian presidential elections slated for the summer of 2000.

The December 19 elections also provide a few lessons for those who want to see Russia a more democratic state with a stronger adherence to tolerance toward its minorities.

  1. Despite the obvious success of the forces associated with the current ruling circles and the liberal camp, it would be shortsighted to conclude that many Russians used their votes to display support for the Kremlin’s much-criticized economic and social policies. Nor can it be said that the young reformers once expelled from the power circles and seen by many as the root of Russia’s evils have once again found favor in the eyes of the voters.
  2. What a significant part of Russian electorate did vote for on December 19 was the newly found unifying national idea that transpired itself in the past few months as a result of the war in Chechnya. Speaking in more general terms, this is the idea of a strong state able to stand up for itself. The same logic explains growing popularity of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Boris Yeltsin’s pick for the next President, who backed the Unity bloc. Recent opinion polls suggest that Putin who has been in the office for just four months, has the best chances of all possible presidential contenders to be elected in 2000. Putin’s popularity skyrocketed after he launched a federal forces’ offensive in Chechnya –the military operation against the breakaway republic which Moscow terms as an anti-terrorist action aimed to protect Russia from Chechen-based terrorism.

  3. This very idea of the strong Russia led by the decisive premier has lessened the support base of many smaller parties which included ultra-nationalism in their electoral campaign. In the previous general elections in 1995, parties that exploit ultranationalism – aside from the Communists that retain their traditional support base of about 20 to 25 percent – received much broader support as compared to 1999. This year, 10 smaller blocs with ultranationalist bias in their campaigns received 11.61 % of the vote, or 6,189,427 votes. (In 1995, such blocs received 21.7% of the vote, or 15,043,274 votes.) A notable loser of this year’s race is the In Support of the Army party co-headed by Communists Viktor Ilyukhin and Albert Makashov, both of whom gained notoriety last year for their repeated anti-Semitic statements. On December 19, this bloc received only 0.59% of the vote.
  4. This year, many of the voters who traditionally lean toward simple solutions and become an easy prey for ultranationalist propaganda of all kinds, preferred to cast their votes for the appearance of force and national dignity that was best represented (this time) by the pro-Kremlin forces which stand behind the seemingly successful war in Chechnya.

  5. The 24.22 percent of the vote received by the Communist Party (22.3% in 1995) effectively dispels the myth that this party’s support is waning as the older generation of Russians – those who are most likely to wish a Communist comeback to power – gradually moves off the scene. As long as Russia experiences difficulties in dealing with real economy and social sphere, this party can rely on a stable segment of popular support.
  6. Communists whose campaigns include ultranationalism and Russian chauvinism, still enjoy a broad and stable support from the lowest-paid and most socially unprotected layers in Russian society. Despite the absence of such an ill-famed figure as Albert Makashov (who was disqualified from the race in his constituency on the eve of the election), the Communist group in the Duma may continue to hold to its traditional ultra-nationalism, which at times assumed forms of open hate propaganda against Jews and other minorities.

  7. Many Russian voters, especially in the remote provincial districts, tend not to pay attention to the ethnicity or religious affiliation of those seeking elected offices. This can be best illustrated by the fact that several Jewish contenders, or those widely believed to be of Jewish extraction, won the ballot in their single-mandate constituencies. Among those are controversial tycoons Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, lawmaker and popular Soviet-era crooner Josef Kobzon, provincial journalist Boris Reznik, parliamentary from St.Petersburg Petr Shelisch.

At the same time, the presence of some of these figures in the next composition of the Duma makes it necessary for observers to be on the alert. In the past, some of these individuals – including powerful and wealthy Kremlin insiders Berezovsky and Abramovich, as well as former prime minister Sergei Kiriyenko and former deputy premier Boris Nemtsov both of whom are half-Jewish – were frequent targets of anti-Semitic slurs voiced by opposition politicians and the media.

One should also take into account that in a country like Russia, the result of general election may have little effect, if any, on the political development on the local level. Those Russian regions that have particularly disturbing record in respect to the rule of law, human rights and minority rights should remain a focus of public attention regardless of outcome of the Duma elections.

5. In addition to sharing the general issues of concern to the populace -- such

as Russia's badly faltering economy and rising crime rates -- the Jewish community has concerns of its own when assessing the returns of parliamentary election. This year, Russian Jews have many reasons to be satisfied with outcome of the elections.

Most of the blocs and individuals known for their anti-Semitism and

ultra-nationalism did not make it to the Duma. Those included Spas movement,

the front organization for Russian National Unity group, and former Communist lawmaker Albert Makashov. Both the movement and the legislator who was seeking reelection, were disqualified for technical reasons during the campaign.

Another reason for the majority of Jewish voters to feel relieved is the new balance of power in the incoming Parliament. Although Jews are not monolithic in their political thinking, Jewish voters generally support liberal and centrist forces at a level stronger than the average support these parties gain on the national level.

At the same time, some Jewish voters may feel uneasiness about the fact that two of the most controversial Russian political – business tycoons Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, both of whom have Jewish roots – have won seats in the new parliament.

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RESULTS OF DECEMBER.19 DUMA ELECTIONS

On December 19, twenty-six parties and blocs were included in election ballots (13 in 1993, 43 in 1995)

Only six of them won parliamentary representation by clearing the required 5-percent threshold (8 and 4 parties won Duma representation in 1993 and 1995 respectively.)

The six are:

1. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation - 24.22 % of the vote

2. The Unity bloc (recently-formed pro-Kremlin party headed by the popular Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu) - 23.37%

3. Fatherland-All Russia movement (the left-center opposition movement headed by ex-premier Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, both foes of the Kremlin) - 12.64%

4. The Union of Right Forces (co-chaired by Boris Nemtsov, Sergei Kiriyenko and Irina Khakamada, the leading figures in the liberal Western-minded camp, that was not represented in the previous Duma) - 8.72%

5. Yabloko (the opposition reform party of liberal economist Grigoriy Yavlinsky)

- 6.13%

6. Zhirinovsky Bloc (a.k.a. the Liberal Democratic Party of ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky) - 6.08%

According to Russian electoral law, half the seats in the 450-member Duma are distributed proportionally to those party lists that capture more than 5 percent of the national vote.

The other 225 seats go to the winners of a direct vote for candidates in Russia’s single-seat districts. Under this formula, candidates whose party failed to receive the required minimum of 5 percent are nonetheless capable of being elected to the Duma.

Unlike 1995 when over 50 percent of the "party-list" votes was cast for parties that received no representation, this year less than 18 percent of electorate voted for the parties that did not make it to parliament. These votes are to be distributed proportionally between those lists that have cleared the 5-percent threshold.

After adding the party lists of the six winners to the seats won by the parties in local single-mandate contests, experts suggest that the next Duma will have the following composition:

  • Communists - 111 seats (may ally with Fatherland-All Russia)
  • Unity - 76 seats (will ally with Union of Right Forces)
  • Fatherland-All Russia - 62 seats (may ally with Communists)
  • Union of Right Forces - 29 seats (will ally with Unity)
  • Yabloko - 22 seats
  • Zhirinovsky Bloc - 17 seats (as a proven Kremlin’s ally, may join the alliance of Unity and Union of Right Forces)
  • Independent lawmakers- 133 seats (many are expected to join the party groups)

Prepared by Lev Krichevsky
Director, Center on Anti-Semitism and Extremism in Russia
December 20, 1999
Moscow