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July 25, 2000
To: JCPA Member Agencies
From: Martin J. Raffel, Chief Operating Officer
Nava Edelman, Program Assistant
Estee Yaari, Program Assistant
Re: Conclusion of the Middle East Summit: Summary
of Conference Call with David Makovsky
On July 25, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs (JCPA) convened a
conference call, moderated by Martin J. Raffel, chief operating officer
of the JCPA, to discuss the conclusion of the Middle East peace summit
at Camp David. The call featured David Makovsky, senior fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of the Institute’s
Project on America, Israel and the Peace Process. Following are Mr.
Makovsky’s major points of interpretation:
- President Clinton’s remarks at the White House press conference,
in which he described Prime Minister Barak as a person of "particular
courage, vision and understanding of the historical importance of
this moment," were revealing. President Clinton’s statement,
though always polite and never disparaging toward Arafat made his
position known. He made little reference to Chairman Arafat, and noted
that Barak was more forthcoming in the negotiations. Clinton speculated
that this might be because Israel had thought through and prepared
for the compromises necessary for peace but, unlike the Prime Minister,
Arafat did not move forward from his initial position.
- Makovsky likened Camp David II to the Geneva summit [between Syrian
President Hafez Assad and President Clinton] this past March. Prime
Minster Barak made generous offers at that time and the ball was then
in Syria’s court. A similar pattern existed at Camp David, where there
was willingness on Israel’s part to go the extra mile, and the ball
was in Arafat’s court; however, he did not pick it up and instead
let the opportunity pass by.
- "It takes two to tango" -- an agreement cannot be reached
without both parties making concessions. Barak could not be the only
one.
- Were other Arab leaders playing a constructive role in this process?
Had King Hussein of Jordan still been alive, Jordan’s presence would
have been very different. It appears King Abdullah has taken a much
more laissez faire approach and has been a non-factor.
Key issues at the summit were:
Jerusalem:
- Barak wanted to reach an agreement whereby Jerusalem would be:
- More Jewish -- Barak envisioned enlarging Jerusalem by including
neighborhood outside the city limits, like Maale Adumim, the Gush
Etzion block, and Pisgat Zeev, thereby increasing the number of Jews
within Jerusalem’s borders.
- Larger -- the annexation of the above areas would nearly double
the size of the city.
- Recognized internationally and have all the embassies moved to Jerusalem.
- On the other hand, Ikrima Sabri, the Arafat-appointed mufti of Jerusalem
stated, "we believe in the sanctity of Jerusalem and what is
around -- acknowledging our religious and historical right to our
holy city and affirming our right of complete sovereignty over every
speck of dirt in it."
- Makovsky referred to Jerusalem as the "third rail of Israeli
politics"; if you touch it, you get fried.
- The president wanted a partial deal without addressing Jerusalem.
Barak had agreed, but Arafat refused. The ripeness was not there.
Refugees:
- Barak was forthcoming on this issue as well. He was willing to allow
thousands of refugees into Israel over time on the basis of family
reunification. Additionally, Israel would contribute to an international
fund to resettle and compensate the rest.
Land:
- Barak proposed land swaps in which Israel would annex blocks of
land with the most of the Jewish settlers and "sand dunes"
outside of the Gaza Strip would be transferred to the Palestinians
in return.
- Reports suggest that Barak was willing to cede up to 94% of the
West Bank.
- Chairman Arafat created unrealistic expectations for his people.
He did not adequately prepare his public to accept less than 100%.
What happens now?
- There are countervailing pressures on both sides. Does Barak form
a unity government with Likud or try to recreate his coalition? The
price of forming a government with Likud is that there would be no
"give" on the Jordan Valley and Jerusalem. If Barak opts
for such a unity government, it will be a sign that he believes the
process is over for the time being and his intentions are to focus
on the domestic agenda. During Barak’s press conference before departing
Washington DC, he said that the Palestinians are just not ready for
peace.
- There is pressure on the Palestinian side to unilaterally declare
statehood. This, however, would be counterproductive in the midst
of the U.S. election cycle. In addition, President Clinton made clear
that all parties should avoid any unilateral declarations; a signal
to Arafat that the United States would not recognize a Palestinian
state resulting from a unilateral declaration.
- It is reported that the United States may send a high level official
to the region, probably Secretary of State Albright. However, it is
unlikely that either Albright or Dennis Ross would be able to accomplish
in a quick visit to the region what the president could not do over
15 intensive days, often working with the parties until 5:30 a.m.
Following Mr. Makovsky’s analysis, Yosef Livne, deputy consul general
of Israel in New York, stressed that:
- Whatever was discussed at Camp David cannot be taken as a future
starting point for continued talks. All ideas discussed during the
summit are now void.
- When one puts everything in perspective, even as Israel approached
the negotiations two weeks ago, there was a true awesomeness in the
summit’s focus on the riskiest and most sensitive issues.
- Prime Minister Barak came to the United States knowing there would
be a price for peace and a painful one, but as he noted in his statement
at the summit’s conclusion, he was not prepared for "peace at
any price."
- Israel does not think the peace process is dead and is committed
to finding ways to reach an agreement.
Martin J. Raffel concluded the call by reiterating to the participants
that the community relations field has an important role to play in
this situation. "It is our responsibility to interpret these events
to the Jewish and general communities, drawing upon the positions and
perspectives we have developed over the years."
As always, feel free to contact the JCPA with any questions or comments.
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